CURRENT PROBLEMS REGARDING T=

STANDING

OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO SUE
IN AMERICAN COURTS
There is no ground for the notion, that a foreign sovereign cannot'
sue in the courts of this country ..
. [I] t would be a nzonstrous
injustice if he could not.'
Although numerous rules of international law govern the sovereign
activities traditionally carried on by nation states,2 different rules often
apply to a nation's commercial activities.3 These activities have caused
many problems, 4 especially regarding standing, sovereign immunity, and
acts of states.
The general United States practice has been to prohibit only unrecognized governments from suing in its courts, 5 but the current world
situation calls for a reappraisal of this policy since the United States is
unfriendly toward several countries which it recognizes. Moreover, because
many nations own or control their principal industries so that any party
doing business with them must deal commercially with the governments,
it has become more likely that these governments will be plaintiffs in American courts. The Castro regime is an excellent example of a recognized
government that is unfriendly toward the United States; the situation there
1 Lord Redesdale in Hullet & Co. v. King of Spain, 1 Dow & Clarke 169, 176,
6 Eng. Rep. 488, 491 (H.L. 1828).
2 E.g., maintaining armies and navies, conducting diplomatic and consular relations, protecting the interests of nationals.
3

See

RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES

§ 72 (Pro-

posed Official Draft 1962), recognizing the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
as declared in Letter From Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the State Department, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman, May 19, 1952, in 26 DEP'T STATE
Buu. 984 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Tate Letter] ; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, art. 24, para. 6, 63 Stat 2255, T.I.A.S.
No. 1965. Compare Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926),
and The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), with Ex
parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). But cf. Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S.
30, 31-32 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
4 For a comprehensive series of articles discussing state trading and its contemporary effects, see 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PaoB. 241-528 (1959).
In Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 40-41 (1945), Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, quoted with approval the following statement of
Lord Maugham in Compania Naviera Vascongado v. The Christina, [1938] A.C. 485,
521:
Half a century ago foreign Governments very seldom embarked in trade with
ordinary ships, though they not infrequently owned vessels destined for public
uses, and in particular hospital vessels, supply ships and surveying or exploring vessels. These were doubtless very strong reasons for extending the
privilege long possessed by ships of war to public ships of the nature mentioned; but there has been a very large development of State-owned commercial ships since the Great War ....
In the Tate Letter, the Department of State referred to "the widespread and
increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities."
26 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 985.
5 But see text accompanying notes 48-54 infra.

(417)

418

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.112:417

has become particularly difficult due to the severance of diplomatic relations 6 between the two nations. The state of relations between the United8
States and Cuba 7 and the nationalization of most of Cuba's industry
present numerous problems concerning the standing of Cuba to sue in
American courts.
Courts frequently fail to recognize the distinction between sovereign
immunity and standing to sue. 9 Historically, a foreign government was
immune from all suits in American courts as a matter of international
law, 10 but current authorities indicate that this immunity is no longer so
broad. While a foreign warship is immune from attachment, it is not clear
that a vessel owned by a foreign sovereign and engaged in commercial
activities is immune. In the now famous "Tate Letter" 11 of 1952, the Department of State announced that "it will hereafter be the Department's
policy to follow" the practice of granting immunity only for the sovereign
acts of the nation, as distinguished from its commercial acts.' 2 Most nations
seem to agree with the State Department theory,13 but it has not been
uniformly followed in American courts.14
6 The severance of diplomatic relations has caused the most confusion. John
Basset Moore, in MoORE, CANDOR AND COMMON SENSE 30 (1930), quoted in 6 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (1943), stated:

While international law classes the severance of diplomatic relations among
non-amicable methods of procedure, pointedly implying dissatisfaction and
protest, it is equally true that the maintenance of such relations does not involve the abandonment of any claim or difference but only keeps open the
channel of discussion.
Cf. Government of France v. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co., 48 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) (severance of relations with Vichy regime); The Gul Djemal, 296 Fed. 563
(S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd on other grounds, 264 U.S. 90 (1924) (such governments

may not file unofficial suggestions of immunity).
7The severance of diplomatic relations occurred on January 3, 1961. 44 DEP'T
For information relating to the Cuban situation see U.S.
STATE BULL. 103 (1961).
DEP'T OF STATE FOR SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
EVENTS

IN UNITED STATES-CUBAN

RELATIONS

(Comm. Print 1963); Note, The

Castro Government in American Courts: Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State
Doctrine,75 HARv. L. RLv. 1607 (1962). See generally OLIVER, THE INTER-AMERIcAN
SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE CUBAN CRISES

(1962).

8 See P & E Shipping Corp. v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 307
F.2d 415, 418 (1st Cir. 1962), and authorities cited therein.
9 See text accompanying notes 54-59 infra.
10 See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 570-74 (1926).
Immunity from suit differs from immunity from execution. Compare Dexter &
Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930). "[fln
the [State] Department's view, under international law the property of a foreign
sovereign is immune from execution even in a case where the foreign sovereign is
not immune from suit." Letter From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State
to the Attorney General, March 9, 1959, in 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 643 (1960).
11 See note 3 supra.
12 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 985.
13 "It is thus evident that with the possible exception of the United Kingdom little
support has been found except on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites for
continued full acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity." Ibid.
See ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 301 (1933).
14 See, e.g., Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd,
295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Harris & Co. Advertising, 149 So. 2d

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS' STANDING TO SUE

The standing of a foreign government to sue in American courts rests
upon principles different from those governing sovereign immunity. The
weight of authority overwhelmingly supports the proposition that recognized foreign nations sue in American courts not as a right, but as a
The given reason for allowing such suits is international
privilege.-I
comity, 16 a courtesy based upon good will toward the recognized government. Courts have tended to equate comity with recognition, stating that
the standing of a foreign nation in American courts depends on whether
it is recognized as a de jure government.1 7 Since there have been few
cases during peacetime 18 prior to the advent of the cold war which involved
a recognized state with which the United States did not have amicable relations, it is only natural that the concepts of comity and recognition would
become equated. But recognition of a government by the United States
at some past time does not show present comity between the two nations.
The question of comity is resolved by an examination of the policies and
activities of the governments involved; recognition depends upon an
historical act of the Executive, possibly during a period when the status
of the two nations was quite different.' 9 It is probable that the illogical
384 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1963) ; State v. Denkle, 137 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct App.
1962); Gonzalez v. Industrial Bank (of Cuba), 33 Misc. 2d 285, 227 N.Y.S.2d 456
(Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 33, 186 N.E.2d 410, 234 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1962).

15 "[T]he privilege . . . of suing in our courts" is "extended by comity." Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134 (1938). "To deny him [foreign
sovereign] this privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling." The
Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164, 167 (1881).
18 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 15, at 134; The
Sapphire, supra note 15, at 167; Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v.
See generally Franck, The Courts,
Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923).
the State Department and National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial Abdication, 44
MINN. L. REv. 1101, 1110-11 (1960) ; Stevenson, Effect of Recognition on the Application of Private International Law Norns, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 710 (1951).
17 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 15, at 137; Japanese
Gov't v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Government of France v. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co., 48 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1943);
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1941) ; Varga v. Credit-Suisse, 5 App. Div. 2d 289, 171 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1958) ; Russian
Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923).
There is only one reported case of an unrecognized government being allowed to sue
in a United States court. See Consul of Spain v. The Conception, 6 Fed. Cas. 359
(No. 3137) (C.C.S.C. 1819) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 235
See also HERWzy, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITIONq IN INTERNATIONAL
(1821).
LAW 112-38 (1928); Harvard Law School, Research it International Law, in 26
Am. J. INTL' L. Sup'. 503 (1932).
IsWartime considerations are so different as to be inapplicable. See, e.g., Government of France v. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co., 48 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1943);
cf. United States v. Insurance Cos., 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 99 (1874); Stumpf v. A.
Schreiber Brewing Co., 242 Fed. 80 (W.D.N.Y. 1917); Plettenberg, Holthaus & Co.
v. I. J. Kalmon & Co., 241 Fed. 605 (S. D. Ga. 1917); Telkes v. Hungarian Nat!l
Museum, 265 App. Div. 192, 38 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1942).
19 The decision to recognize a particular government has not been based upon
United States approval of the regime since the so-called "Vilsonian policy" was
discarded. The pre-Wilson practice of recognizing existent governments in control
of the state with the general acquiescence of the people has been reaffirmed. Thus
recognition is not in itself based upon comity. See United States Recognition Policies
in 1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 174-91 (1940). But see United
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equation of comity with recognition is a result of imprecise judicial language
in cases permitting a recognized government to sue as a matter of existent
comity. No cases have thoroughly considered the problem involved in a
suit by a recognized government with which the United States does not
carry on amicable relations.
Between 1917 and 1933-prior to United States recognition of the
Soviet government-there were numerous cases considering the effect of
nonrecognition of a foreign government.20 These cases firmly established
the principle that only recognized governments can ever sue in American
courts; thus, when a government is not recognized there is no need for
courts to determine whether comity exists, since the allowance of standing in American courts would be inconsistent with the political policy of
nonrecognition.2 1 Where there has been no recognition, the frequent discussions of comity by courts are superfluous-although they generally
equate nonrecognition with lack of comity. 22 Thus, in Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrarioasthe New York Court of Appeals

held that the unrecognized Soviet government could not sue in an action
to compel an accounting from an allegedly dishonest purchasing agent.
The court went on to say that the plaintiff could not sue since nonrecognition barred the extension to it of comity--"reciprocal courtesy" 24 -and that
comity is extended to nations exclusively by recognition. Moreover, jurisdiction depended upon the public policy of the forum as expressed by the
State Department and clarified by a refusal to recognize. Numerous other
authorities agree with Cibrario, but few consider the basis of the court's
approach.
In those areas of the law where judicial action could conceivably affect
the foreign relations of the United States, the Executive branch of the
States Policy of Nonrecognition of Communist China, 39 DEP'T STATE BuLu. 385
(1958), stating that
basically the United States policy of not extending diplomatic recognition to
the Communist regime in China proceeds from the conviction that such recognation would produce no tangible benefits to the United States or to the free
world as a whole and would be of material assistance to the Chinese attempts
to extend Communist domination throughout Asia.
See also 57 AM. J. INT'IL L. 119 (1963) (recognition of military junta in Peru).
20 For an excellent analysis of these cases see Lubman, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts: Upright v. Mercury Business Machines, 62 COLUm. L.
REv. 275 (1962).
23 The element of recognition inherent in permitting an unrecognized government standing to sue is analogous to State Department refusal to participate in multilateral diplomatic conferences when East Germany or Communist China would also
be present.
22 See authorities cited note 16 supra.
23 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923).
This case evoked a storm of criticism.
See, e.g., JAFFE, JUDIcIAL AsPEcts oF FoREIGN RELATIONS 149-56 (1933) ; Borchard,
The Unrecognized Government in American Courts, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 261 (1932) ;
Dickinson, The Unrecognized Government or State in English and American Law,
22 MicE. L. Rav. 118 (1923). However, its authority has been largely unquestioned,
at least until recently. See text accompanying notes 74-79 infra.
24235 N.Y. at 258, 139 N.E. at 260.
2 See authorities cited note 17 supra.
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Government, specifically the State Department, has exerted considerable
influence.2 6 Thus the "suggestion" of the State Department that a specific
defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity is generally regarded as conclusive, 27 and some courts will bestow such immunity in anticipation of a
State Department suggestion. 28 Moreover, in situations involving the
"act of state" doctrine, State Department action or inaction is relevant if
not binding32 In some instances courts have attempted to read some meaning into State Department utterances, even though the State Department
had no intention of affecting the resolution of a case in any way. 0 The
justification for such nonjudicial determination of cases is twofold: first,
the Executive branch is entrusted with carrying on the foreign relations
of the United States,3 1 and the courts are hesitant to do anything which
might embarrass the Executive in this function; 3 2 and second, it is argued
that such questions are political rather than judicial, and therefore properly
resolved by the political branch of the Government. 33 It is clear that the
26 See, e.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) ("courts are
required to accept and follow the executive determination that the vessel is immune");
Varga v. Credit-Suisse, 5 App. Div. 2d 289, 290, 171 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (1958)
("plaintiff is not a sovereign power . . . because the group . . . is not recognized
by the State Department"). See generally Griffin, Adjective Law and Practice in
Suits2 7Against Foreign Governments, 36 TEmP. L.Q. 1 (1962).
E.g., Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295
F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). See generally Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated
One of Its Functions?, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946); Lyons, The Conclusiveness
of the 'Suggestions' and Certificate of the American State Department, 24 Bart. YB.
INT'L L. 116 (1947).
28 Republic of Cuba v. Arcade Bldg., Inc., 104 Ga. App. 848, 123 S.E.Zd 453
(1961) ; cf. Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30, 31-32 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting). It is well-settled that, to be binding, the suggestion must come from the United
States rather than the foreign government. The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90 (1924);
see Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1921).
29 Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 960 (1962) ; cf. Gonzalez v. Industrial Bank (of Cuba), 33 Misc. 2d 283,
284, 227 N.Y.S.2d 456, 458 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 3, 186 N.E.2d 410, 234
N.Y.S.2d 210 (1962) : "The State Department of the United States has not filed any
suggestion that sovereign immunity be considered in this action. Its failure or refusal
to suggest such immunity is accorded significant weight." See also Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 372 U.S.
905 (No. 403, 1962 Term, renumbered No. 16, 1963 Term); Cardozo, Judicial
Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication 30
to Usurper?, 48 CoREr.L L.Q. 461 (1963).
See P & E Shipping Corp. v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 307
F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1962), 14 SYRAcUsE L. Rr-v. 517 (1963). See discussion accompanying
notes 41-47 infra.
31
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936):
"[T]he President . . . [is] the sole organ of the federal government in the field of

international relations."
32 "Hence it is a guiding principle in determining whether a court should exercise or
surrender its jurisdiction in such cases that the courts should not so act as to embarrass
the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs." Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945). "The guiding principle to be followed . . . is that the
not so act as to embarrass the executive arm in the conduct of foreign
courts should
affairs. ' Franck, supra note 16, at 1101. But see Mann, Judiciary and Executive in
Foreign Affairs, 29 TRANSACt. Gaor. Soc'y 143, 148-56 (1944) ; text accompanying
notes 70-72 infra.
33
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, supra note 32, at 35; Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938). See generally Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as National Law: "Political Questions," 104 U. PA. L. Rv. 451 (1956);
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political department renders decisions on recognition and other general
foreign policy questions, but certain constitutional problems may arise when
the Executive ventures to decide questions determinative of a particular
34
legal action.
I.

CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL ACTION

In Republic of Cuba v. Mayan Lines, S.A., 3 5 the Republic of Cuba

sued to annul a money judgment obtained by defendant Mayan Lines in a
prior action. A lower state court upheld defendant's contention that Cuba
could not sue because it lacked procedural capacity and held that, as it was a
nation with which the United States does not carry on diplomatic relations, proper certification of a representative to bring the suit on Cuba's
behalf was impossible 36 The Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed and
held that any recognized "foreign sovereign" could bring an action in
American courts in its own name. The court stated that the error of the
trial court "lies in the failure to distinguish between continuing diplomatic
recognition of sovereignty and the maintenance of continuing diplomatic
relations between sovereigns." 37
According to the court, recognition continues until "expressly withdrawn . . . by the appropriate political department" of the United States

GovernmentY
The breach of diplomatic relations with Cuba was of no
moment to the court. Although the general rule has been that courts will
equate recognition with comity and comity with standing to sue, the court
eliminated all consideration of whether comity existed between the two
governments. While this approach eliminates the fictitious aspects of the
recognition-comity equation, it ignores the fact that standing to sue is a
privilege generally granted to foreign governments and not a legal right
accompanying recognition. 39 Such a legalistic approach oversimplifies the
problems involved in order to obtain a uniform result.4"
Jaffe, Standing To Secure Public Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265,
1305 (1961); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAgv.
L. REv. 1 (1959). See text accompanying notes 70-72 infra.
34 See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
35 145 So. 2d 679 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
36
1d. at 681-82.
37 Id. at 683.
38 Ibid.
39 See Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, No. 27689, 2d Cir., Nov. 20, 1963;
Compania Ron Bacardi, S.A. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 193 F. Supp. 814, 815
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). The courts reached the same result as the court in Mayan Lines
regarding a Cuban corporation. In the latter case, the court stated: "With respect
to the status and acts of the Cuban government, United States executive expressions
at this time leave little doubt that the national policy to be followed by American
courts requires that the standing of this plaintiff be recognized."
40 For the proposition that severance of diplomatic relations does not alter the
sovereign's standing in United States courts, the court cited Corpus Juris Secunduam
and dictum in Lehigh Valley R.R. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1927).
145 So. 2d at 683. A similar approach was taken in Japanese Government v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), which held that Japan
could sue in United States courts even though the claim had arisen in 1949 while a
state of war still existed and therefore during a period when the United States did
not carry on diplomatic relations with Japan. The State Department seems to agree
with this position. 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 409-10 (1963).

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS' STANDING TO SUE

In P & E Shipping Corp. v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de
Cuba,41 defendant P & E Shipping Corporation had refused to deliver a
cargo of beans and potatoes to Cuba following the United States embargo
on exports to that country. The nationalized bank which carried on the
foreign commerce of the Cuban government sued to recover damages for
breach of the maritime contract. Relying upon the severance of diplomatic
relations, the court of appeals reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and
remanded the case for the district court to ascertain from the State Department the status of the Republic of Cuba in American courts, the plaintiff
bank's relationship to the Cuban government, and the status of United
States plaintiffs in Cuban courts.4
This decision relied primarily upon a statement in National City Bank
v. Republic of China 43 that "the status of the Republic of China in our
courts is a matter for the determination of the Executive and is outside the
competence of this Court." 44 In that case, the Supreme Court allowed a
setoff against the Republic of China, overruling a plea of sovereign immunity. In reaching that decision, the Court was cognizant of State Department policy regarding the sovereign immunity issue at hand and was
not referring to the standing of the plaintiff. Yet the court in P & E took
the statement to indicate a desire on the part of the Supreme Court to allow
all questions touching upon the "status" of a foreign government in
American courts to be decided by the State Department.
The underlying rationale of the P & E decision was the court's fear
that by reaching a decision without State Department guidance it would
embarrass the Executive branch in its conduct of the foreign relations of
the United States. But, regardless of whether a breach of contract is likely
to turn into a serious international incident, any fear of prejudice to this
country's foreign relations is unwarranted, since at worst the Executive
could disclaim responsibility for what was an inapt decision by the court
and remedy the situation diplomatically. 40 The most probable way to
embarrass the Executive would be to force it to make a decision it did not
want to make which could have some binding effect upon it in the future;
this the court did by requesting advice which the State Department had
shown no desire to give.46 Unlike a question of sovereign immunity, which
may result in attachment of sovereign property, the question of standing
47
is properly decided by a court.
41307 F.2d 415 (lst Cir. 1962), 4 HA v. INT'L L. CLUB J. 114 (1962), 14 SYRAcusE L. REV. 517 (1963).
42 307 F.2d at 418.
43 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
44 Id. at 358.
45 See Mann, supra note 32, at 153.
46In the Tate Letter, the State Department stated that "the widespread and
increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities
makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to
have their rights determined in the courts." 26 DEP'T STATE BuLL. at 985; cf. 56 Am.
J. INT'L
47 L. 526-31 (1962) ; Griffin, supra note 26, at 3-4.
InRussian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 158, 147 N.E. 703, 705
(1925), the court stated that the State Department "cannot determine how far the
private rights and obligations of individuals are affected by acts of a body . . .with
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Dade Drydock Corp. v. The M/T Mar Caribe48 was an admiralty action
in which the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank of Cuba intervened as claimant of the M/T Mar Caribe, alleging that as a credit institution and mortgagee of the vessel it was entitled to possession thereof. The
vessel was being used for the commercial purposes of the Republic of Cuba
at the time of attachment. The court held that, as an arm of the Cuban
government, the bank could not intervene or sue as claimant. 49 A plea of
sovereign immunity had been refused because of the breach of diplomatic
relations and the failure of the State Department to file a suggestion of
immunity. 50
The basis of the decision was the court's conclusion that the Republic
of Cuba was not recognized by the United States and therefore neither
it nor anyone acting on its behalf could bring suit. The court was obviously
incorrect in its concept of recognition: it stated that the break in diplomatic
relations "resulted in withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the Republic
of Cuba." 51 The court found no authority to justify equating severance
of diplomatic relations with withdrawal of recognition; in fact, there are
52
large differences between the two.

The court may have reached a desirable result, however, since the
underlying basis of the decision seems to be the obvious lack of comity
between the two governments. The court did not treat the comity concept
at all, but it is apparent that the existence of strained relations was largely
responsible for the decision.0 While the court was plainly unaware of the
legal issues involved in regard to comity, recognition, and the breach of
diplomatic relations, its result may be preferable to those reached by more
which our Government will have no dealings." See also The Pacquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677 (1900) ; Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of InternationalLaw in the
Federal Courts of the United States, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 280, 294 (1932), in which
the author states, "the court may draw upon the subject-matter of international law
because that law forms part of the municipal common law of the land."
48 199 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
49 The court did not hold that the action abated or was subject to dismissal. It
simply held that the action is suspended during the period of severed diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba. Id. at 874.
50 The court stated that the "plea of sovereign immunity is not available on
behalf of the Republic of Cuba," citing The Gul Djemal, 296 Fed. 563 (S.D.N.Y.
1921), aff'd on other grounds, 264 U.S. 90 (1924), which merely held that Turkey,
with which the United States did not then carry on diplomatic relations, could not
file an unofficial suggestion of immunity. 199 F. Supp. at 874.
51 Ibid.
-2 The distinction was recognized in Republic of Cuba v. Mayan Lines, S.A., 145
So. 2d 679 (La. Ct. App. 1962). See text at note 37 supra; Japanese Gov't v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Harvard Law School,
Research in International Law, supra note 17, at 504, also stated that different conclusions should be drawn from lack of recognition and severance of diplomatic relations. In BRIGGS, THE LAW oF NATIONS 132 (1952), the author states: "Severance
of diplomatic relations is not necessarily a withdrawal of recognition."
53 Compare this result with the following statement from The Gul Djemal, 296
Fed. 563, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), aff'd on other grounds, 264 U.S. 90 (1924) : "If a
breach of such relations means simply that thereafter a government may by indirection
obtain and secure for itself the same rights and privileges that would, but for the
breach, be directly accorded it, the severance of relations is an idle ceremony, so far
as comity between nations is concerned."
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extensive considerations of the issues.54

Certainly, the policy questions

present in a determination of comity are more related to a current severance
of diplomatic relations than to an early, and perhaps premature, recognition.
II.

CONFUsION BETWEEN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND STANDING To SUE

Several cases which were decided on principles relating to a nation's
standing to sue could have been decided on other theories. Both Mayan
Lines, a civil action resulting in a money judgment, and Dade, an admiralty
attachment proceeding, were first presented as sovereign immunity questions with Cuba as a party defendant. 55 Full determinations of the rights
and liabilities of the parties should have been reached in these earlier suits,
Even though it is arguable that Cuba was not entitled to sovereign immunity,5 6 this should have been the basis for the decisions rather than the
standing of the unfriendly sovereign. Such manipulation of the issues
should not be allowed, as knowledgeable parties may be able to succeed as
defendants when success as a plaintiff would not have been possible. And
by such maneuvering a party may take advantage of a situation where the
sovereign is unable to protect its property through legal means.
Since sovereign immunity turns on considerations different from standing, the courts should be on guard against parties who wish to confuse the
two issues. For example, if an officer of a local government attaches property belonging to a foreign sovereign and the sovereign brings suit to invalidate the attachment on the ground of sovereign immunity, the court
should examine the validity of the attachment to determine whether it is
valid under the applicable sovereign immunity doctrine. A simple refusal
to allow the sovereign to bring suit would in effect give what may be an
illegal act the stamp of judicial approval, rendering sovereign immunity a
death blow as a viable and enforceable doctrine. 57 Since the Executive
cannot be expected to remain aware of all such actions, especially when
diplomatic relations are not conducted with the nation in question,5 8
54
In Plasticos Industriales Extrusos, S.A. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 38 Misc. 2d
9, 237 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mein., 240 N.Y.S.2d 934 (App. Div. 1963), the
court, considering a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens in order
to permit Cuban claimants to intervene in another forum, stated: "There is no showing
that any alleged claimants may sue in our courts.' Id. at 10, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
55 See text accompanying notes 36 and 50 supra.
66 See Drachsler, Some Observations on the Current Status of the Tate Letter,
54 Am.J. INT'L L. 790 (1960) ; authorities cited note 3 supra and accompanying text.
57 Compare the denial of standing in this situation with withdrawal of state and
federal court jurisdiction which deprives parties of substantive rights, as was argued
in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335

U.S. 887 (1948). For a development of this analogous problem see HART & WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 292-302 (1953).
58 Severance of diplomatic relations makes it difficult to carry on the normal com-

munications between governments. For example, the ostensible reason given by
President Eisenhower for the break was the requirement by Cuba that the United
States reduce its staff to eleven officials, which would "render impossible the conduct
of normal diplomatic relations."

44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 103-04 (1961).

During the

period of the severance, Cuba must utilize the Czechoslovakian embassy as intermediary in order to make its grievances known to the United States Government.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOR SENATE CoMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 88TH CONG., IsT
SEsS., EVENTS IN UNITED STATES-CUBAN RELATIONS 19 (Comm. Print 1963).
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sovereign property must be protected by other means. Perhaps the Executive should be informed by the nation in question through the consular office
of the representing government-Czechoslovakia in the instance of Cuba-, 9
but there is little assurance that such a scheme would succeed, and, in certain
situations, the task must fall upon the courts. To do otherwise would be to
facilitate confiscation of sovereign property.
It is clear that two types of confusion are likely to recur: a standing
problem being treated as a sovereign immunity case, and a sovereign immunity issue being treated as a standing problem. Although there may be
little danger respecting the latter type of confusion when the Tate Letter
suggests that there is no sovereign immunity, courts should face this issue.
But when there is no immunity, or when a standing case is confused with a
sovereign immunity problem, solutions will result only from a willingness
on the part of courts to analyze carefully the elements of the particular case.
Several cases involve no sovereign immunity question but are different
from ordinary litigation only in the sovereign nature of the plaintiff. The
P & E case is an example of an action in which the primary legal issue is
that of the standing of the plaintiff. But P & E was decided by reference to
a sovereign immunity precedent,60 in much the same way as Dade and
Mayan Lines, which were sovereign immunity cases, were viewed as standing questions. Since state trading is currently of great importance, commerce in general will be hampered by confused legal treatment. Moreover, it appears clear that the problems are amenable to solution if courts
and counsel will look at them realistically rather than legalistically.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

A. All Recognized Foreign Governments Have Standing
The virtues of the approach utilized by the Mayan Lines court are its
certainty, its uniform result, and its amenability to judicial determination.
The diversity of results in standing cases indicates the need for a uniform
standard making it possible for a litigant to predict his rights and liabilities,
especially whether he is suable or can sue. The results of the Mayan Lines,
Dade, and P & E cases, in which no agreement whatsoever was shown,
demonstrate this need, and, when those cases are contrasted with analogous
cases not even raising the issue,61 it becomes obvious that the system has
not adequately coped with these peculiarly modern problems. As state
59 See Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la

Habana, 218 F. Supp. 938 (D. Md. 1963).
60

The court cited National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955),
as controlling the "status" of the Republic of Cuba in United States courts. See text
accompanying note 43 supra.
61 Such judicial decisions were rendered in at least two appellate cases after
relations were severed. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 372 U.S. 907 (No. 403, 1962 Term, renumbered No. 16,
1963 Term) ; Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 960 (1962).
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trading becomes the rule rather than the exception, the problems can only
become more acute.
The judicial rather than Executive determination of the Mayan Lines
approach also militates in its favor. Aside from the Executive's preference
for judicial determination, 2 and the elimination of the Executive from a
judicial aspect of foreign relations, restricting these issues to the judiciary
would allow the courts to develop uniform standards for the related problems involved. This increased competence is not possible if the courts
are willing to defer to the Executive upon slight or no evidence of possible
foreign policy repercussions. Unsolicited judicial abdication, as in P & E,
may cause some of the very problems it attempts to avoid.
But under the Mayan Lines theory, the concept of international comity
-properly the basis for the standing of a foreign sovereign in American
courts 3--is an utter fiction. Since all recognized governments could bring
suit in American courts, comity would have the same meaning as recognition, an unusual equation. Mr. Justice Bradley's statement in The
Sapphire 64 that to deny a foreign sovereign the right to sue "would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling" 65 is undoubtedly correct, but
where a lack of "comity and friendly feeling" has already been manifested
it seems pointless to allow the sovereign to sue. The fallacy in the Mayan
Lines approach lies in the assumption that past recognition indicates present
comity. Furthermore, this assumption cannot be overriden by any action
short of withdrawal of recognition.
It is doubtful that recognition may ever be withdrawn, except when one
government is replaced by another and the new government is recognized
in its place. 66 Since "instances of express withdrawal of recognition are
rare and withdrawal of recognition unaccompanied by the recognition of a
new regime practically nonexistent," 67 it would not be possible under existing international practice to prevent the foreign government from bringing suit in the courts of the recognizant. It is very doubtful if the merits
of the Mayan Lines approach justify such a straitjacketing of both the courts
and the Executive.
Even if it is assumed that international practice permits the Executive
to withdraw recognition of a particular government because of a conflict
in national policies, this drastic action with all its collateral effects may not
6

See note 46 supra.

63

See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1871).

6478

G5 Id. at 167 (dictum).
In this case the Supreme Court upheld the right of the
French Emperor to bring suit in American courts.
66"Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable." Inter-American Convention on
Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. VI, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 3802.
RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UrrED STATES § 99 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962), states that recognition may be withdrawn "only if (1) the recognized government does not exercise the functions of government . . . ; or (2) the
recognizing state has reserved the power to withdraw the recognition; or (3) the
is effected by recognition of a successor government."
withdrawal
7
6 Bnac-s, op. cit. supra note 52, at 132.
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be justified by what could be an inconsequential gain realized by denying
the unfriendly government access to American courts. The United States
would be faced- with two alternatives: withdraw recognition or allow the
government to sue in American courts. This lack of alternatives could
impair the resolution of many already difficult problems.68
B. Ad Hoc Executive Determinations
The approach of the P & E court gives the Executive flexibility in
solving problems as they occur, without being bound by prior action on the
part of the judiciary or the Executive. Since the effects of a particular
determination will probably vary from case to case, it is arguable that
any other method would unduly restrict the conduct of United States foreign
relations. But concomitant with this approach is the danger of judicial
deferral in favor of the Executive, with the Executive exercising a right
of decision appropriately exercised only by the courts.6 9 Moreover, the
uniform standard attainable via the Mayan Lines approach cannot be
achieved unless the State Department chooses to be bound by its past
decisions, which is not only unlikely but also undesirable if needed flexibility
is to be assured. The mere concept of the ad hoc determination is alien to
the common-law tradition, especially in cases that lend themselves to
judicial determination, and it is doubtful if the exigencies of the situation
require nonjudicial resolution. Furthermore, when the standing of foreign
sovereigns is in issue, the State Department has shown no desire to intervene 7°-evidence of the Executive's disagreement with the approach of the
P & E court.
The ostensible reason for judicial deference to the Executive is fear
of embarrassing the Executive in its conduct of foreign relations. But this
fear, often resorted to as a rationale in cases concerning sovereign immunity
or acts of state where the likelihood of embarrassment is greater than
in standing-to-sue cases, often seems to be of makeweight proportions.
Obviously, certain decisions by courts result in conflicts with Executive
policies. But these situations are probably more rare than is imagined, and
the damage inflicted may not be as serious as certain judges seem to feel.
Sir Wilfred Greene summarized these contrary arguments when he stated:
I do not myself find the fear of the embarrassment of the Executive
a very attractive basis upon which to build a rule of English-law,
and, in the present case, the argument presents a certain air of
unreality . . ..
[I]t would appear that the Executive is in
need of being protected against itself. 71
68 For a discussion of the policy of recognition, see note 19 supra.

69 See Jessup, supra note 27.
70 See authorities cited note 46 vtpra.
71 Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Bantham S.S. Co., [1939] 2 K.B. 544,
552 (dictum).
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Certainly, the avoidance of embarrassment must be balanced against the
evil resulting from refusals by courts to ascertain and declare the law. In
the P & E case, for example, it is unlikely that there would have been any
resultant Executive embarrassment, however the court might have decided
the issues. Even if the Executive had a firm policy against allowing Cuba
to recover damages in American courts, allowing Cuba to recover for breach
of contract to deliver beans and potatoes would cause little direct harm to
the conduct of United States foreign relations. Similarly, a nonallowance
of suit when the Executive desired that suits be allowed would be minor
in its consequences; at worst, the Executive could award the suing nation
its damages by diplomatic negotiations in return for an assignment of a
claim against the United States defendant.72 Of course, in particularly
precarious situations the courts would still have to look to the Executive
for statements of policy, but these occasions are extremely rare and thus
should not serve as a foundation for general United States policy.
While the practice of applying to the Executive for guidance is a useful
device clarifying potentially difficult decisions for the courts, the possible
embarrassment that might result from an improper decision by a court
must be weighed against the embarrassment caused by forcing the Executive
to make a decision it neither is prepared to make nor desires to give. Even
when a policy is formulated, the Executive may not wish to disclose these
views or intentions for what may be very crucial foreign policy reasons.
An incorrect judicial decision, however undesirable, may be preferable to an
Executive declaration, since the judicial decision does not commit the Executive but leaves it free to disclaim adherence to the incorrect views. 73
C. Application of Public Policy
74

In Cibrario, the Soviet government was barred from bringing suit
in the United States for misappropriation of its funds. The basis for the
refusal was the nonrecognition of the Soviet government which led the court
to conclude that the United States would not extend comity to the Soviet
Union. In arriving at its conclusion, the court stated:
72 Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) ; Upright v. Mercury Business
Machs. Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 39, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417, 421 (1961). In Upright, the
court stated that "the lack of jural status for such government or its creature cor-

poration is not determinative of whether transactions with it will be denied enforcement in American courts, so long as [that] . . . government is not the suitor."
73 See Mann, Judiciary and Executive in Foreign Affairs, 29 TRAISAcr. GRoT.

Soc'x' 143, 148-56 (1944).

While it is certain that the practice of applying to the Executive is in many
respects a useful device, it should not be overlooked that it may sometimes be
more embarrassing to the Executive than an independent decision of the
Courts which does not commit the Government and may be, therefore, often
less prejudicial than Judges are inclined to think. . . . [T]he danger of
the existing practice lies in compelling an unwilling or temporising Executive
to disclose its views or intentions.
Id. at 153.
74 Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139
N.E. 259 (1923).
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Undisturbed the rule of comity is our only guide. This rule is
always subject, however, to one consideration. There may be no
yielding, if to yield is inconsistent with our public policy ...
[J] urisdiction depends upon the law of the forum, and this law in
turn depends upon the public policy disclosed by the acts and
declarations of the political departments of the government 5
Under this approach, the courts determine the application of the public
policy to the particular case at hand.
While a rule grounded upon the public policy of the United States
would be helpful in determining standing-to-sue questions, it is not altogether clear that such a rule could be successfully implemented or applied.
In cases like Cibrario, where the plaintiff government was not recognized
by the United States, the public policy was more apparent than in most
current situations. Moreover, the Cibrario approach has been the subject
of frequent criticism 76 and has been limited in its application by the recent
decision in Upright v. Mercury Business Machs. Co., 77 which held that it
is not contrary to the public policy of the United States to allow an assignee
of the unrecognized German Democratic Republic to bring suit in the
United States.
The practical considerations inherent in a scheme whereby the courts
look to the State Department for determinations of policy point out the
difficulty of obtaining a uniform result, as there is no assurance that different
courts will draw the same inferences from a given statement of policy.
Therefore, there would be a probability of ad hoc decisions by the courtslittle improvement over the ad hoc State Department determinations likely
to result from the P & E approach. Although it is now clear that an unrecognized government cannot bring suit in American courts, 78 there would
be no restriction to prevent courts from overturning their holdings in an
unbroken line of cases by deciding that a particular government, recognized
or not, could sue because the suit is in accord with the policy of the forum3 9
It is not unlikely that courts would frustrate the foreign policy objectives
of the Executive by making clearly inaccurate policy determinations, misinterpreting a decision of the political branch. To avoid this possibility, the
State Department would be forced to make declarations of policy to cover
every conceivable instance, declarations the State Department might not
wish to make.
75

Id. at 259-60, 139 N.E. at 260-61 (dictum).
See Lubman, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts: Upright v.
Mercury Business Machines, 62 CoLum. L. Ray. 275, 298-99 (1962) ; authorities cited
note 23 supra.
77 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961) ; see Lubman, supra note 76, at
299-310.
78 See authorities cited note 17 supra.
76

79 "So, too, only limited effect is given to the fact that the political arm has not
recognized a foreign government." Upright v. Mercury Business Machs. Co., 13
App. Div. 2d 36, 39, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417, 420 (1961) (dictum).
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IV. CONCLUSION: UTILIZING PAST POLITICAL ACTION
AS A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMITY

The current cold war situation, when all-out war cannot be utilized as
a weapon of national policy, calls for some means short of withdrawal of
recognition whereby the Executive can deny the favor of standing to unfriendly governments in American courts. There is an anomaly in not
allowing the People's Republic of China to sue and allowing the Cuban
government this privilege, wholly because at some time the Executive chose
to recognize one established regime and not the other. The basis of these
Executive decisions was undoubtedly different from the considerations
regarding standing to sue. Furthermore, in the present Cuban crisis, the
political policy is clear; Congress and the Executive have, through particular acts, declared open economic warfare upon Cuba. 0 Since Cuban
standing is ultimately dependent upon political action (existent comity),
the courts should further this policy rather than detract from it. But courts
should not allow the Executive to make determinations that are dispositive
of a case, once it has reached the courts; while cognizant of foreign affairs

policy, courts must still fulfill their function of deciding individual cases.
In addition to the reasons already given in favor of judicial determination of
such cases, the policy behind the constitutional requirement of separation
of powers 81 and the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts to decide
cases and controversies is at odds with nonjudicial determination. International law is applied by the judiciary,82 and so long as jurisdiction has
3
been properly invoked, courts have a duty to decide all judicial questions,8
including the standing of the parties. While a court may rely on prior
Executive statements in much the same way as legislative history aids a
80 On July 3, 1960, Congress gave the President the authority to reduce the import
quota on Cuban sugar; on October 19, 1960, the United States prohibited exports
to Cuba, with certain minor exceptions; on September 7, 1961, the United States
prohibited assistance to any country which assists Cuba, unless the President should
determine otherwise; on February 3, 1962, the United States proclaimed a complete
embargo on trade with Cuba, except for exports of food and medicines; on March 24,
1962, the United States prohibited imports of merchandise made or derived in whole
or in part of products of Cuban origin. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOR SENATE CoMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 88TH CONG., IST SEss., EVENTS IN UNITED STATES-CUBAN RELATIONS 14, 18, 20, 21 (Comm. Print 1963). On July 8, 1963, at the request of the

Secretary of State, the Treasury Department instituted orders that (1) block all
assets in the United States of Cuba or of persons in Cuba, (2) prohibit persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from engaging in unlicensed transfer of
United States dollars to or from Cuba, and (3) prohibit all other unlicensed transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals or transactions involving property in which
there is a Cuban interest 49 DzP'T STATE BULL. 160 (1963), referring to Dep't
State Press Release No. 360, July 8, 1963.
81 Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1951). Perhaps some American decisions to the contrary are results of reliance upon British precedents, cases
from a country which does not require separation of powers.
82 "The Judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2. See The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Sprout, supra note
47, at 294.
83 Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-15 (1962) ; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
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court to interpret a statute, an independent judiciary must refrain from
abdicating its case-deciding function to the Executive.
Although there is no question that the Dade court was incorrect in
equating breach of diplomatic relations with withdrawal of recognition, for
the purposes of that case the equation might have been proper. The conflicts which caused the severance of diplomatic relations are analogous to the
reasons for refusing to recognize what is obviously a de facto government
in the case of Communist China. Therefore, if lack of recognition indicates
a lack of comity, a severance of diplomatic relations indicates this same
condition, and the same result should ensue.
It is arguable that this result may hamper the foreign relations of the
United States because in some situations the State Department may deem
it expeditious to allow a particular government to sue.8 However, this
objection is equally appropriate to the blanket refusal to allow unrecognized
governments to sue, and no serious consequences have resulted from that
denial. The arguments in favor of close Executive supervision of individual
legal actions even remotely affecting international relations may be valid in
the contexts in which they generally appear 8 5-- act of state and sovereign
immunity-but there is no reason to carry the rationale outside these
spheres of application. The experience in reference to disallowance of suit
by unrecognized governments indicates that the same problems do not
arise, and the results should not differ in other instances where comity is
nonexistent.
Consistent with the constitutional requirement of separation of powers,
this approach retains the aspect of judicial determination of the Mayan
Lines approach without its accompanying unrealism. The Executive
branch would not intrude into judicial matters, as in P & E, nor would it
be forced to disclose views upon which it may prefer to remain silent.
When the Executive might wish to negate a judicial result in the name of
United States foreign relations, the avenues of diplomatic settlement would
remain open, and, if the problems are particularly acute, the diplomatic solution would probably be more effective. 6
J. Gordon Hansen
84 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 47-48, Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, cert. granted, 372 U.S. 905 (No. 403, 1962 Term, renumbered
No. 16, 1963 Term).
85 See generally Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions:
Recognition of Prerogativeor Abdication to Usurper?, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963) ;
Franck, The Courts, the State Department and National Policy: A Criterion for
JudicialAbdication, 44 MiNN. L. Rxv. 1101 (1960).
86 The power to enter into such agreements is part of the general constitutional
grant to the Executive to carry on the foreign relations. See United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Such diplomatic solutions would fall into
the general category of Executive agreements. See generally BIsHoP, INTEr ATIONAL
LAw 94-105 (2d ed. 1962).

